Recently, botnets such as Mirai and Persirai targeted IoT devices on a large scale. We consider a acks by botnets on cyber-physical systems (CPS), which require advanced capabilities such as controlling the physical processes in real-time. Traditional botnets are not suitable for this goal mainly because they lack process control capabilities, are not optimized for low latency communication, and bots generally do not leverage local resources. We argue that such attacks would require cyber-physical botnets. A cyber-physical botnet needs coordinated and heterogeneous bots, capable of performing adversarial control strategies while subject to the constraints of the target CPS.
INTRODUCTION
Botnets are still one of the major threats in the cyber-security landscape. IT botnets take advantage of Internet services such as IRC, HTTP, email, and DNS to achieve di erent goals including information and identity the , spam, DDoS and malware distribution [48] .
e Mirai and Persirai IoT botnets are typical examples of IT botnets for DDoS [6] . In the OT space, we have seen advanced malware such as Stuxnet [18] and Blackenergy [29, 36] using botnet-like components to a ect the availability of the target cyber-physical system (e. g., DoS and damaging the equipment).
However, we have not seen botnets capable of cyber-physical system (CPS) adversarial control. We claim that current botnet designs are not su cient to achieve this goal, mainly because high-impact a acks on a CPS require di erent strategies than conventional cyber-security a acks [23, 49] . ese strategies translate into additional requirements that are not addressed by conventional botnet designs. For example, a conventional botnet does not di erentiate its bots according to the capabilities of the infected devices and does not allow coordinated interactions among the bots. We think that it is bene cial to introduce a new class of botnets, de ned as cyber-physical botnets, designed to overcome those additional challenges. We expect that be er understanding of capabilities and shortcomings of cyber-physical botnets will raise awareness with stakeholders of threatened systems, and allow the defenders to design more suitable countermeasures.
In this paper, we present CPSBot, a framework to build cyberphysical botnets. CPSBot enables to build botnets with heterogeneous and coordinated bots able to take over the control of a CPS. CPSBot is generic over the target CPS, it allows to develop botnets with di erent network architectures and to use di erent adversarial control strategies. We underline two of the most important design choices that we made to satisfy our requirements. Firstly, we use a novel command and control channel based on the publisher-subscriber (PubSub) paradigm [7, 17 ] to get precise coordination among bots with minimal overheads. Secondly, we de ne a set of orthogonal functionality that we call traits to customize the development of a CPSBot. is modular approach is used to exploit the functionalities o ered by di erent infected devices of a cyber-physical system and to customize the C&C servers.
Our a acker model considers a botmaster that already managed to infect the target devices (how is outside the scope of this work). We present two design examples of CPSBots targeting a centrally controlled system and a system with distributed control. We compare our examples against the traditional counterparts and we motivate why we think that the la er are not su cient to enable adversarial control of the target systems. We provide an implementation of the centralized botnet where an a acker is coordinating infected gateway devices to in uence the distribution of water across remote substations. We use MQTT for the C&C protocol and we target the Modbus/TCP industrial protocol.
We used our implementation to perform two coordinated cyberphysical a acks on real and simulated Water Distribution. e rst a ack is de ned as distributed impersonation and the a acker is able to simultaneously impersonate geographically-sparse remote terminal units. e second a ack is de ned as distributed replay and the a acker is able to reply values and control actions across (potentially heterogeneous) devices in di erent substations.
We argue that traditional botnet metrics, such as number of bots and DoS bandwidth, are not su cient to evaluate a cyber-physical botnet. Hence, we de ne our own set of quantitative metrics suitable to evaluate the CPSBot framework such as adversarial control period and additional delay introduced by CPSBot and we use those metrics to evaluate our cyber-physical a acks.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We propose CPSBot a framework to design cyber-physical botnets. Our framework addresses the extra-requirements introduced when a acking a cyber-physical system such as adversarial control and bots coordination capabilities. We use a publisher-subscriber command and control channel and traits to address those extra-requirements.
• We design a centralized and a decentralized CPSBots targeting a centrally controlled system and a system with distributed control. We implement the former botnet optimizing it for precise coordination among bots using MQTT features such as quality of service, persistent sessions and asynchronous communication.
• We launch two coordinated cyber-physical a acks: distributed impersonation and distributed replay to assess our implementation. Both a acks were performed on simulated and real water distribution testbeds, with minor code modi cations. We evaluate them with our quantitative metrics for cyber-physical botnets.
is work is organized as follows: in Section 2, we provide the background about botnets, cyber-physical systems and our target water distribution system. In Section 3 we present the design of CPSBot starting from our problem statement and threat model. We focus on the PubSub C&C channel and the CPSBot traits.
en, we show two examples of centralized and decentralized CPSBots. We conclude the section with our set of quantitative metrics for cyber-physical botnets. In Section 4, we present how we implemented a centralized CPSBot using MQTT and Modbus/TCP to a ack our target water distribution system. In Section 5 we describe the CPSBot a ack phases and we present and evaluate the distributed impersonation and distributed replay a acks using the implemented centralized botnet. We discuss several CPSBot attack strategies and optimizations in Section 6. Related works are summarized in Section 7, and we conclude the paper in Section 8.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Botnets
A botnet is a network of compromised hosts (bots) that are managed by one or more command and control (C&C) servers. e a acker (botmaster) is connected to the C&C infrastructure and she is sending directives to the bots through it. e channel of communication between the a acker and the bots is called C&C channel, and it is one of the most important parts of a botnet [48] . A canonical way to classify a botnet is by its network architecture. Most commonly a botnet is either centralized or decentralized 1 .
A centralized architecture has one C&C server that communicates with all the bots. A client-server protocol is used for the C&C channel (e. g., IRC or HTTP). e main advantages of this setup are its low latency and ease of coordination. e main weaknesses of this setup are its vulnerability to single point of failure and network scalability issues when the number of bots increases. Alternatively, in a decentralized architecture, all compromised devices are used both as bots and C&C servers. e C&C channel uses a peer-topeer protocol (P2P) such that the bots establish an overlay network.
is architecture is self-scalable and does not su er from single 1 In this context decentralized in synonymous of distributed.
point of failure. However, it might be di cult to implement (e. g., hosts behind NAT) and coordinate (e. g., orders from multiple C&C). ere are also hybrid architectures that provide a tradeo between centralized and decentralized schemes, and random architectures where the bots are not contacting the C&C server but they are waiting to be contacted by the botmaster.
It is possible to represent the state of a botnet using a ve-phases lifecycle. We have an initial infection phase, where the a acker exploits one or more vulnerabilities on a remote machine. e remote machine becomes a bot candidate. In the second infection phase, the same infected machine is instructed to download and execute di erent types of malware. If the malicious code is e ective then the infected machine becomes part of the botnet. In the third phase, the bot contacts the C&C server and this process is de ned as rallying. e rallying phase might be accomplished using static addresses or dynamic addressing techniques such as DNS fast-ux, and domain generation algorithms (DGA). e fourth phase is the a ack phase, where the bot perform malicious activities and might still exchange information with the C&C (e. g., ex ltrate data).
e last phase is the maintenance phase, where a botmaster might modify the bot network con guration, upload new a ack payloads and update the cryptographic keys of the botnet.
e C&C channel uses either the same protocol of the target system or a custom protocol (de ned as neoteric [55] ). e former approach is, in general, less easy to detect because the malicious network tra c is similar to the expected one. However, once the extra-tra c is detected then the defender can isolate the o ending tra c and try to understand what is going on. e la er approach generates network tra c that might stand out compared to the normal one. On the other hand, it is more di cult for the defender to decode the information carried in a neoteric packet [28] .
Cyber-Physical Systems (Security)
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are composed of heterogeneous devices that are interacting with a physical process. ese devices are typically interconnected and they are programmed to perform general-purpose or domain-speci c tasks, including sensing, actuating, and networking. It is possible to divide cyber-physical systems (CPS) in two categories: CPS with a central or distributed control. In the rst case, the CPS uses a central monitoring and control infrastructure. For example, a water distribution industrial control system is centrally controlled by a SCADA server. In the second case, the CPS uses multiple controllers, each controller manages a sub-system and it is able to communicate with the other controllers. For example, a building automation system (BAS) is an example of a distributed control system. ere are also examples of distributed control system where the control logic of one controller depends on signals coming from other ones. ese signals are called interlocks. A water treatment system is an example of an interlock-based distributed control system. e usage of Internet-friendly protocols and commodity hardware vastly increased the a ack surface of cyber-physical systems [9, 30, 32, 38] . CPS are vulnerable to classic information security threats, a acks targeting the underlying physical processes, and the intersection between the two [24] . In this paper, we are interested in the la er type of a acks, de ned as cyber-physical a acks (e. g., a ack over the network that permanently damages a local component).
e Water Distribution (WaDi)
e Water Distribution (WaDi) testbed is a water distribution autonomous systems built at Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD) in 2016. It is designed as a down-scaled version of the water transmission and distribution system operated in Singapore. WaDi enables simulating di erent water demand pa erns, water hammer e ects, changes in pipe pressures and pipe leakages. Furthermore, it allows simulating water pollution by means of organic and inorganic contaminants that can be added to the distribution of water to the consumers.
WaDi is composed of three sub-processes: water supply, water distribution, and water return. e rst stage operates by taking the source water from two elevated raw water tanks (2500L each) and transferring it to two elevated reservoirs (1250L each). In this stage, water quality analyzers are used to verify the incoming water quality. In the second stage, the potable water is distributed to six consumers tanks (500L each). e water demand of Each consumer tank can be set independently and changed in real-time. In the third stage, the water is collected in the single water return tank (2000L) and then optionally returned back to the supply stage.
WaDi has di erent types of sensors (e. g., water level sensors, ow meters, water quality sensors) and actuators (e. g., water pumps, valves). e remote terminal units are SCADAPack 334E devices (Schneider Electric), the gateway devices are MOXA oncell G3111-HSPA and the industrial switches are MOXA ED5 205A. e WaDi supervisory network uses the Modbus/TCP industrial protocol.
CPSBOTS FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL ATTACKS
In this section, we present our problem statement and the related system and a acker model. en, we focus on the CPSBot C&C channel and on the traits. We show the high-level architecture of two CPSBots: a centralized botnet for ICS and a decentralized botnet for IoT. We conclude the section de ning a set of quantitative metrics derived from the design of our botnets.
Problem Statement
Our main challenge is related to adversarial control of a system that has a physical process and several interconnected heterogeneous devices (i. e., a cyber-physical system). With adversarial control, we refer to the a acker's capability to steer the physical process of the target system into states of her choice. Typically, this requires both understanding of the physical process, and a suitable control strategy (e.g., using closed loop control).
We think that traditional botnets are not su cient to launch coordinated a acks on CPS systems for several reasons. Firstly, they do not address the problem of adversarial control, and they are instead focusing mostly on system disruption (e. g., DDoS) and observation (e. g., eavesdropping). Adversarial control of the system would require near real-time exchange of eavesdropped data and malicious control commands between distributed bots together with one or more adversarial controllers. We argue that traditional botnets are not designed to provide such features. Secondly, IT botnets consider their bots as a homogeneous set of devices (e. g., zombies), without exploiting their di erent hardware and so ware capabilities [48] . However, in a cyber-physical botnet, some bots have di erent roles such as in uencing the physical process and spoo ng the monitoring system. irdly, traditional botnet designs are not optimized for CPS constraints such as latency, packet size and throughput. In our case, these constraints have to be taken into account and measured in some way.
In summary, we would like to build a new class of botnets able to perform coordinated cyber-physical a acks. We de ne those botnets as cyber-physical. In general, a cyber-physical botnet have to resemble a control system, and the main di culties to be addressed in its design are the following:
• Introduce an adversarial and coordinated control strategy on a CPS in real-time.
• Exploit the diversity of the bots, including their speci c hardware and so ware capabilities.
• Evaluate the tradeo between richness of bots functionality and associated overheads using sound metrics.
System and Attacker Models
Our system model focuses on two types of cyber-physical systems: a system with centralized control and a system with distributed control.
Centralized Control. We consider a (potentially geographically distributed) system composed of n substations that are centrally controlled (e. g., a water distribution system). Each substation is controlled by a remote terminal unit (RTU) that is able to read sensor values and control actuators. ere are no intrusion detection systems deployed in the substations. A central SCADA server is periodically monitoring the substations and it can send commands to the RTUs. A network-based intrusion detection system (IDS) is monitoring the inbound and outbound tra c from the SCADA network.
Distributed Control. We consider an IoT system with distributed control (e. g., a building automation system) that is deploying m devices. Each device has a speci c functionality such as monitor and control the temperature of a room (e. g., HVAC), video surveillance (e. g., CCTC), and lighting control system (e. g., LCS).
Attacker model. We consider an a acker who already completed the necessary steps to map the network of the target system, infect the devices, and perform the rallying phase (e. g., the a acker is able to remotely contact the bots via the C&C). We believe that this is a reasonable a acker model to adopt both in the ICS and IoT scenario given the recent trends and surveys [15, 37, 43, 46] . e main goal of the a acker is to use bots in a coordinated fashion to take control over the target cyber-physical system, adding an adversarial operation in the closed-loop control routines (see Figure 1 ). In this setup the a acker, as the original controller, takes advantage of readings from multiple sensors (coming from di erent bots) and use this knowledge to send malicious actuation command to drive the system to an arbitrary state or sequence of states. roughout the paper, we use the words a acker and botmaster interchangeably.
CPSBot: PubSub C&C Channel
We propose to use publish-subscribe (PubSub) messaging pa ern for the C&C channel. In a PubSub scheme, there are three entities: the publisher (sender), the subscriber (receiver) and the broker (dispatcher). e communication is event-driven and there is a loose coupling between the sender and the receiver. is scheme encourages the use of asynchronous communications in contrast with client-server periodic request-response cycles (e. g., polling) [7, 17] . In our context, we consider a cyber-physical botnet with heterogeneous bots subscribed to relevant events (e. g., sensor values and actuator states) and one or more C&C nodes publishing commands and updating events based on those values in real-time. To the best of our knowledge, the PubSub scheme has not been proposed for a botnet C&C channel before, and is particularly well suited for our application.
Traditional IT botnets are using di erent C&C control protocols mainly because they target di erent systems (e. g., client-server architecture). For example, IRC, DNS, email, and HTTP protocols are popular choices [55] . In our system models (e. g., ICS, and IoT) those choices are either inapplicable (e. g., the protocol is not spoken in the system) or sub-optimal. As an illustration, HTTP is sub-optimal because it is a client-server protocol (not event-driven) and it is not designed for machine-to-machine communications (packet size is not a problem) 2 .
We list some crucial advantages that we think we would gain from a PubSub control channel compared to conventional ones in the context of ICS and IoT systems:
• Flexible coordination among bots and C&C : -Enabled by event-driven messaging.
-It allows using synchronous and asynchronous messaging schemes, multicast tra c, proactive and reactive bots coordination.
• Compatibility with di erent botnet architectures:
-Enabled by loose coupling of publishers and subscribers.
-It allows building conventional (centralized, decentralized) and non-conventional (hybrid, random) botnets.
• Addresses traditional and CPS botnets constraints:
-Enabled by the nature of PubSub intended for reliable and secure machine-to-machine communication [10, 41] . -It allows scaling the botnet size maintaining low computational and tra c overheads. For example, we can use anonymity [16] , con dentiality and integrity mechanisms such as TLS or alternatives [27] .
CPSBot: Bot Traits
We already introduced the problem of cyber-physical bot heterogeneity that translates into the need of bots supporting di erent functionalities. ose functionalities derive from the role of a bot in 2 We can apply a similar reasoning for the other traditional C&C protocols.
an a ack and they are limited from the so ware and hardware capabilities of the bot. We address the heterogeneity challenge using CPSBot traits. A trait represents a set of functionalities that a CPSBot device might support. is enables to design a cyber-physical botnet that is modular (e. g., reuse same functionality across different devices), extensible (e. g., improve a functionality without a ecting the others), and composable (e. g., mix functionalities in a single device). We note that traits allow to customize both the bots and the C&Cs. We borrow the concept of trait from object-oriented programming theory [47] . We describe six traits that are relevant to our paper: In ltrator. e In ltrator a ects the network con guration of the infected device. For example, it might con gure the bot as a malicious proxy able to passively observe tra c, actively send payloads, forward tra c to another network interface, and disconnect the bot from an arbitrary network. In a typical setup, the number of In ltrators scales linearly with the number of CPSBot bots.
Forger. e Forger tampers with the data coming from sensors, actuators, and other connected devices. For example, it might locally modify an actuator value while spoo ng a remote monitoring server. We note that the Forger takes advantage of di erent hardware capabilities of the infected bots (e. g., in uence the physical process). In a typical setup, the number of Forgers is proportional to the number of CPSBot bots.
Controller. e Controller takes care of the adversarial control of the target system. In general, the Controller takes input from the cyber-physical system and optionally from other CPSBot bots, and predicts the future input-output state. e prediction could be computed using di erent orthogonal techniques such as machinelearning classi cation, real-time simulation, and state estimation techniques (e. g., Kalman ltering). is functionality is typically implemented by the C&C in a centralized CPSBot, and by the infected controller devices in a decentralized CPSBot. A discussion about di erent prediction strategies is presented in Section 6.1.
Broker. e Broker functionality is used to coordinate the CPSBot network. It asynchronously and synchronously sends event information to all the botnet nodes. For example, a Broker manages the communication between two bots without having them know each other and even if one of them is disconnected from the CPSBot network. Typically, this functionality is implemented by the C&C in a centralized botnet and by multiple nodes (e. g., broker clustering) in a decentralized botnet. We note that, an architecture with multiple Brokers tolerates single-point-of-failure in the CPSBot network.
Pub. e Pub allows the CPSBot devices to send data over the botnet network asynchronously. e granularity of the published content can be set (e. g., publish an aggregate of sensor values versus a single sensor value). Furthermore, the Pub could set the quality of service of each published (sent) value. For example, the botmaster can coordinate the botnet using an event-based priority scheme dependent by the message type (topic-based) or the message value (content-based). is functionality is typically carried out by all CPSBot nodes. Sub. e Sub allows the CPSBot devices to receive data over the CPSBot network. Each Sub might subscribe to any information exchanged in the CPSBot network, and get it on-demand, without sending a request all the times (event-driven).
e subscription process is pre-con gurable to avoid re-subscriptions a er successive disconnections. Additionally, each Sub can create a session with the Broker to let it cache lost messages and retrieve them among re-connection. For example, the C&C node might subscribe to status-critical information to be informed when any of the bots is disconnected from the CPSBot network and react accordingly. Similarly to the Pub functionality, the Sub functionality is typically implemented by all CPSBot nodes. In summary, we think that designing a botnet using traits is an e ective way to address the diversity of devices found in cyberphysical systems. For example, we can use traits to di erentiate the implementations of bots for network spoo ng and bots for adversarial control (we will see two concrete examples in Section 3.5). As a side bene t, the usage of traits lowers the development costs of our CPSBots and this is a key factor for e ective cyber-physical a acks [23] .
Centralized and Decentralized CPSBots
We now present two CPSBots: a centralized botnet a acking a water distribution system (ICS) and a decentralized botnet a acking a building automation system (IoT). We choose these examples because they share similar security functions and weaknesses [8] .
For the sub-gures in Figure 2 , we represent the devices controlled by the a acker with black squared boxes. e traits of the CPSBot devices are represented as black boxes with round corners. e grey boxes represent the targets. Both botnets derive from the system and a acker models presented in Section 3.2.
Centralized CPSBot. In this scenario, the a acker is using a centralized architecture to a ack a centralized control system (e. g., water distribution system). As depicted in Figure 2a , the system is composed of n remote substations and a central monitoring SCADA network. Each substation has a remote terminal unit (RTU) that interacts with sensors and actuators and a gateway device that connects the RTU to the access router. e botmaster has compromised n gateway devices (Bot 1 , . . . , Bot n ). Each bot implements the Forger, In ltrator, Pub and Sub traits. e central C&C is managing all the bots and it is implementing the Controller, Broker, Pub, and Sub traits. e bots are altering the state of the physical process in real time with the help of the C&C while fooling the central SCADA server that is periodically querying the RTUs. is CPSBot design is di erent from a traditional one because each bot acts in a di erent manner according to its substation. For example, the rst bot is mainly interested in the sensor and actuator values regarding the rst substation and it generates spoofed commands accordingly. In a traditional setup, each bot will execute the same orders from the C&C regardless of which substation it is a ecting. More information about an implementation of this botnet are presented in Section 4 and the two cyber-physical a acks are evaluated in Section 5.
Decentralized CPSBot. In this case, the botmaster is using a decentralized architecture to a ack a distributed control system, in particular, a building automation system (BAC). As we can see from Figure 2b , the BAC is composed of a heating, ventilation and air-conditioning system (HVAC), an IP camera (CCTV) and a lighting control system (LCS). In this case, each infected device acts both as a bot and as a C&C. All the bots are implementing the Controller trait and they are locally computing their adversarial estimations. Additionally, they implement the In ltrator, Forger, Sub and Pub traits. In this scenario, we take advantage of multiple brokers (e. g., every bot implements the Broker trait) to avoid singlepoint-of-failure. For example, if one bot is compromised the others can still coordinate their actions.
is botnet is di erent from a traditional P2P botnet because each bot has a speci c control strategy depending on the infected device. Additionally, each bot might share control information with the others even if the target system is not interlock-based. For example, a botmaster could use adversarial interlocks to perform cascade cyber-physical a acks (e. g., induce an LCS blackout while tampering with the HVAC load).
Our antitative Metrics
Conventional botnets are evaluated looking at factors such as number and geo-locations of bots and C&C servers, malicious DNS activities, and malware databases [35, 51] . However, we think that to evaluate cyber-physical botnets we have to de ne additional metrics. Table 1 lists our set of quantitative metrics that we are using in Section 5.5 to evaluate our cyber-physical a acks. A checkmark () in the CPS column indicates that the metric is de ned by us to address the CPSBot cyber-physical constraints.
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR ICS
In this section, we present an implementation of a centralized CPSBot to a ack a water distribution industrial control system. In particular, the system is controlled using the Modbus/TCP protocol. We start by mapping the network architecture sketched in Figure 2a to a water distribution network. We then describe how we deal with the target industrial protocol and the botnet C&C channel protocol. We conclude the section showing how we implemented some speci c PubSub features to be er coordinate the CPSBot bots. Figure 3 shows the network topology of a water distribution ICS already compromised by a centralized CPSBot. ere are n + 2 networks: n substation networks, the SCADA network, and the a acker network. Each network has a border router connected to the Internet. e remote terminal units (RTU) are managing local sensors and actuators and they are communicating with the central SCADA server through gateway devices. A network-based intrusion detection system (IDS) is monitoring the inbound and outbound tra c from the SCADA network. e a acker infected n gateway devices that are si ing in between the RTUs and the border routers. e botmaster uses the symbolic links colored in red to communicate with the bots.
Network Topology

Target Protocol: Modbus/TCP
We choose Modbus [33] and in particular Modbus/TCP as a target industrial protocol because it is still widely used on actual industrial plants [39] . Furthermore, Modbus/TCP is adopted in WaDi, the water distribution testbed that we use for our a acks. We understand that Modbus (as many popular industrial protocols) is not secure by design. However, we are not interested in discovering or underlying existent Modbus vulnerabilities.
Modbus includes two data types: registers and bit elds. Registers are 16-bit integers and they are either read-only (input registers) or read and write (holding registers). Bit elds are either read-only (discrete inputs) or read and write (coils). All data types are addressed like an array in memory and the rst array element is at o set zero. Modbus/TCP is a client-server application layer protocol. A Modbus request has a Modbus/TCP header that contains: the transaction number (set by the client and echoed back by the server), the length of the payload, the protocol ID, and the slave ID.
e payload of the Modbus request addresses the requested data with a function code, a memory o set, and a word count. A Modbus response contains a similar Modbus/TCP header and its payload contains the same function code of the corresponding request, a byte count, and the requested data.
Modbus operations are encoded with numeric function codes. e a ack that we present in Section 5 focus on three of them: read coils (0x01), read holding registers (0x03), and write single coil ( 0x05). Read coils is used by a Modbus client to read multiple binary values from a Modbus server. Read holding registers are used by a Modbus client to read multiple 16-bit registers from a Modbus server. Write single coil is used by the Modbus client to write a single bit to a Modbus server.
It is worth mentioning that the Modbus packets are transmi ed using network ordering (e. g., big endian) but the bit elds are stored in reverse bit order. Hence, if the rst byte of the coil memory contains the following bits 01100011, then the last (eighth) bit will map to the rst coil and its value will represent True (1), the seventh bit will map to the second coil and its value will represent True (1), and so on.
C&C Channel: MQTT
We use the Message euing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol for the implementation of the C&C control channel. MQTT is a topic-based PubSub protocol, designed for low-bandwidth, high-latency Machine to Machine (M2M) communication [50] . By default, it runs over TCP, it supports TLS and password-based authentication of clients. All the messages exchanged in the CPSBot botnet are addressable by topic, and their payload is data-agnostic. Topics can be hierarchically organized with di erent paths and each path can contain sub-paths. e set of all topics is called the topic tree, and its design is key for an e ective MQTT botnet coordination.
In Figure 4 we present our implementation of a topic tree suitable to manage our CPSBot a acking a water distribution system. It includes n + 1 paths, where n is the number of a acked substations.
e cpsb path contains one sub-path for each CPSBot device (in this case n + 1 sub-paths). For example, if a node subscribes to the cpsb/bot1/dead topic, then it will receive updates when the e SCADA server is in the central control network. e attacker (via the C&C) coordinates the bots from a remote location using the red links.
bot in the rst substation is disconnecting from the network (together with all the other subscribers). Another usage of this path concerns the maintenance of the bots. For example, we can use cpsb/bot1/sw to send binary so ware updates to the subscribed clients. e subx paths contain the information about the water distribution substations. Each sub-path manages a device (only RTUs in this case) and each sub-sub-path manages sensor and actuator values using the same memory mapping of the target RTU. For example, the sub1/rtu1/hrs topics contain all the messages regarding the values of the holding registers of the rst RTU.
We used mosquitto for the MQTT broker and paho for the MQTT clients. Note that our MQTT setup does not depend on the target industrial protocol and with minor modi cations, it can be adopted for other physical processes.
Coordination of the CPSBot Nodes
MQTT provides several useful functionalities that we are using for coordinated interactions among CPSBot bots. We comment ve of them:
Message QoS. Each publish and subscribe action can be con gured with a quality of service (QoS) value. ere are three possible QoS values for delivering a packet at most once (QoS = 0), at least once (QoS = 1), and exactly once (QoS = 2 ...
Root 1 Root 2 Root n+1
Figure 4: CPSBot hierarchical topics tree design with n + 1 paths. e cpsb path takes care of the messages about the botnet devices. ere are n sub paths, each one takes care of the messages about a water distribution substation. priority scheme based on the message topic. For example, we give maximum priority (QoS = 2) to messages about bot disconnections and medium priority (QoS = 1) to messages about botnet maintenance, critical sensors and actuators values, and low priority (QoS = 0) to the other messages.
Client sessions. MQTT consents to store in the broker(s) a subscription session for each subscriber (client) using a unique ID. We use this feature to optimize the clients' subscription process and message recovery. If the client session is turned on (e. g., by se ing the clean session ag to False) then the client subscribes once to the topics of interest and it does not need to resubscribe upon re-connection. Furthermore, the broker stores all the missed published messages with QoS greater than 0 and it re-publishes them when the client reconnects if the subscription was made with QoS greater than 0.
Asynchronous connections. MQTT supports both blocking (synchronous) and non-blocking (asynchronous) connections to the broker. We decided to use non-blocking clients and servers to optimize the usage of the CPSBots nodes. For example, a bot might perform other tasks while waiting to establish a connection with a broker.
Subscription with wildcards. MQTT supports meta-characters to e ciently subscribe to multiple topics. For example, to subscribe to all coils messages from the second substation a bot can subscribe to sub2/+/cos/*. e + meta-character subscribes to all the topics at the current path level, while the * meta-character subscribes to all the topics in the current path level and below. We use this feature in combination with our topic tree design to allow easy subscriptions to intra-substation and inter-substations topics.
Parametric keep-alive interval. MQTT is transported over TCP and sometimes one of the two hosts in a TCP stream is not working properly. is situation is called half-open connection problem and the MQTT keep-alive functionality is used to x it. Each client can communicate the (maximum) keep-alive time in seconds which broker and client can endure without sending a message. e default keep-alive time is 60 seconds, and if it is set to 0 then this mechanism is not used. We use this feature to ensure that each communication link is working as expected and to manage the relative geographic positions of the MQTT client and the MQTT broker. For example, clients that are geographically closer to the broker may be con gured with a lower keep-alive value than the ones that are farther apart.
CASE STUDY: ATTACKS ON ICS
In this section, we present two cyber-physical a acks performed on simulated and real water distribution testbeds.
e a acks use the centralized CPSBot implemented in Section 4. We rst performed simulated a acks to speed-up the development time and to reduce the risk of damaging actual components. en we performed the same a acks on the Water Distribution testbed (presented in Section 2.3). We start this section by describing the phases of CPSBot-based a ack. en we report on the initialization, distributed impersonation and distributed replay phases. We conclude the section with a quantitative evaluation of the presented a acks using the metrics de ned in Section 3.6.
Phases of CPSBot-based Attack
A CPSBot-based a ack can be decomposed into four phases based on the industrial control system cyber kill chain [26] . e a ack phases are depicted in Figure 5 ). Firstly, we have the Reconnaissance phase. is is a preliminary phase where the a acker tries to get as much information as possible about the target system. Secondly, we have the Initialization phase. In this phase, the botmaster completes the initial infection, second infection, and rallying phases.
irdly, we have the Develop Strategy phase. In this phase, the bots observe the network and the physical process and develop di erent a ack options with the help of the C&C and the botmaster. Finally, we have the Delivery phase where the botmaster launches the attack(s) and tries to reach one or multiple goals. In Figure 5 we list several traditional goals such as DDoS, replay and eavesdropping and cyber-physical goals such as distributed replay and distributed impersonation. We note that CPSBot allows delivering multiple non-interfering a acks at the same time (e. g., impersonate a device while eavesdropping the communications).
In the following section, we assume that the a acker already completed the rst two a ack phases (that are common to all CPSBot a acks) and we discuss two advanced cyber-physical goals: distributed impersonation and distributed replay, Distributed impersonation allows the a acker to impersonate multiple gateway devices at the same time and coordinate their responses to the SCADA server. (see Section 5.3). Distributed replay enables the a acker to programmatically replay messages across substations (see Section 5.4). Figure 6 presents an a ack scenario where a CPSBot bot already infected a gateway device of WaDi. e bot, as in Figure 3 , sits in between the remote terminal unit (RTU) and the access router of the substation. e bot is implementing the In ltrator, Forger, Pub and Sub traits, indeed it is able to spoof the packets coming from its network interfaces.
Initialization Phase
Part of the initialization phase is accomplished using a combination of Ethernet bridging and forwarding techniques, see top-le 1 in Figure 6 . Basically, an Ethernet bridge is a virtual switch that forwards all the tra c from eth0 to eth1 and vice-versa. It can be con gured to act as a rewall at the link and network layers. Once the bridge is established, then the bot is able to observe all the tra c between the RTU and the access router through the bridge interface (br1). e infected gateway devices are running Linux and we used bridge-utils, iptables, and ebtables tools to congure the bridges on the bots. e setup can be easily extended to bridge more than two interfaces.
Additionally, in order to optimize the CPSBot boot time, we are using the initialization phase to start the functionalities of the command and control node. Firstly, the C&C Broker is starting a mosquitto MQTT broker with a customizable con guration le.
en, the C&C Pub and Sub are starting asynchronous paho MQTT clients to establish the CPSBot network. Finally, the C&C Controller starts in idle-mode because there is no physical process data to be processed, see bo om-right 1 in Figure 6 .
Distributed Impersonation Phase
At the beginning of the distributed impersonation phase, the bot In ltrator isolates the RTU from the central SCADA network. is is done by modifying the network interfaces of the bot such that eth1 has the same IP and MAC addresses of the impersonated RTU, see center-le 2 in Figure 6 .
ose steps are performed using a combination of ifconfig, brctl and route Linux commands.
en the bot starts a Modbus/TCP server listening on the same IP and port of the real RTU server. e updating period of the bot server is con gurable via the time manipulation (T M ) parameter. e server is implemented using pymodbus and it runs in asynchronous mode using multiple threads. Once the server is running then the Pub, Sub, and Forger kick in by running the mn.py script. e script activates an asynchronous paho MQTT client that let the bot joint the CPSBot network and enables packet spoo ng on the bot. Note that a er these steps the bot is still connected to the RTU.
Let's assume that Figure 6 represents an impersonation a ack on the rst substation. Let's see how a bot is using the C&C Controller to send a valid Modbus/TCP response a er a valid request from the remote SCADA, see center-right 2 in Figure 6 . e bot intercepts the Modbus request (In ltrator), extracts the addresses of the requested values (Forger), and passes them to the Pub component.
e Pub publishes those addresses into the relevant sub1/rtu1 topics. e C&C Broker module, which is orchestrating the CPSBot network, collects those messages. e C&C Sub module then receives the messages containing the SCADA request addresses from the Broker and pass them to the Controller module. e Controller produces valid response values according to some estimation technique. A discussion about some potential estimation techniques Figure 6 : A CPSBot-based attack on the Water Distribution. Grey/black lines and boxes represent the ICS/CPSBot links and devices. In the initialization phase, the bot is bridging between the RTU and the router, and the C&C starts the Broker process and the Pub and Sub clients 1 . In the distributed impersonation phase the bot disconnects the RTU from the network and start impersonating it by answering to the SCADA requests using the responses produced by the C&C Controller 2 . e same phases take place on the other substations at the same time. Once the botmaster impersonates all the RTUs then she can target the real ones 3 .
is presented in Section 6.1.
e estimated response values produced by the Controller are then published by the C&C Pub module to the relevant sub1/rtu1 topics. e bot Sub module receives the estimated responses from the C&C Broker and passes them to the Forger. en the Forger creates a valid Modbus/TCP response packet and sends it to the SCADA via the In ltrator.
e same impersonation technique is applied in each substation at the same time. In general, this a ack is distributed because it disconnects all the RTUs. It is coordinated since each bot publishes information about its controlled substation and subscribes to information about other substations and about the status of other CPSBot devices. It is cyber-physical because once the botmaster is able to impersonate all the RTUs then she can target the real ones causing high-impact damages on the substations, while fooling the SCADA server, see bo om-le 3 in Figure 6 .
Distributed Replay Phase
e distributed replay a ack is similar to a wireless wormhole attack [12] . is type of a ack enables a bot to replay locally requests and responses that are coming from other remote substations.
We now explain how to replay the content of a Modbus response from the second substation to the rst one. Let's assume that the target request-response concerns the 100th holding register of the RTU in the second substation. We assume that the bots have already completed the initialization phase in the rst and second substation. en, the bot in the second substation will use a combination of iptables and libnetfilter queue commands to extract in real time the hr100 payload from each valid RTU response. It will then publish those payloads in the sub1/rtu1/hrs/hr100 response topic. e bot in the rst substation is subscribed to all the topics concerned sub1. Indeed it will be able to reply to a hr100 SCADA request from the rst RTU, with whatever hr100 value is contained in the second RTU.
We note that the same technique can be used on di erent device's types, on arbitrary sensor and actuator values and di erent substations at the same time. e result is a coordinated cyber-physical a ack that can potentially alter the state of several substations without requiring detailed knowledge of the physical process by the botmaster (e. g., if a ack is successful in one substation replay it on the others).
Evaluation of the CPSBot Attacks
We performed a series of measurements on the C&C and two bots while conducting the distributed impersonation and distributed replay a acks both in the simulated and real Water Distribution. For the network analysis, we used Wireshark's built-in statistics and expert information to measure delays and to ag anomalies in TCP connections. While we used Wireshark for convenience, we note that detection rules in popular IDS, such as Bro and Snort will work similarly [45] , so we expect the results to be representative. e main di erences between the simulated and the real CPSBot a acks are in terms of hardware. In the simulated a ack, we used MiniCPS [5] to simulate a CPSBot-based a ack on Water Distribution. MiniCPS is a toolkit to perform real-time cyber-physical system simulations using lightweight virtualization and it is based on mininet [52] . For the real a acks performed on the Water Distribution testbed (see Section 2.3), we used a commercial laptop running a Linux OS to host the C&C station, and we modi ed Linux-based gateway devices to act as bots. e same code was run for the simulated and real initialization, distributed impersonation and distributed replay phases. What changed were the IP addresses (because of DHCP) and the network interface names (since they are set by the OS). Table 2 lists the results of our evaluation using the metrics presented in Section 3.6. e SCADA polling period is in the order of few seconds (T S ) and we set the adversarial estimation period (T C ) and the maximum tra c manipulation periods (T M ) to approximately be the half of it. Both simulated and real a acks generated one and four warning messages about TCP packets with the reset ag set. We note that those few warning messages could be avoided by improving the way the bot handles existing TCP connections a er the a ack starts.
Recall that µ d denotes the average delay introduced by the CPSBot. In our experiments, µ d was computed from the central SCADA server comparing the response times while the system was and was not under a ack. Interestingly, µ d resulted to be close to 0 ms. is means that our centralized CPSBot implementation did not cause signi cant delays in the real and simulated SCADA system. We expect that this is due to our asynchronous communications (e. g., bots do not have to periodically wait for the messages coming from the C&C) and our custom traits for the bots and the C&C (e. g., bots implementation is focused on the network manipulation while the C&C focuses on the adversarial control).
A minor issue that we experienced a acking the real testbed is related to ∆ s and ∆ r that are respectively the average time di erence between the last valid RTU packet and the rst packet spoofed by a bot, and the average time di erence between the last SCADA request and the rst valid spoofed response by a bot. We have a signi cant discrepancy between the a acks in the simulation framework (few milliseconds) and in the real testbed (seconds). However, this situation is experienced only one time when the a ack is started, nonetheless, we are planning to conduct more experiments to be er investigate it. Finally, we note that the average CPU load and memory (RAM) consumption on each bot is under 30%. is should allow performing the same a acks using devices that are even less powerful than our infected gateway devices.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss di erent ways to develop an adversarial control strategy, several methods to increase the stealthiness of our CPSBots and some techniques to optimize the presented a ack.
CPSBot: Control Strategies
So far, we have not discussed how the a acker should develop a suitable control strategy to take over the physical process state. We now brie y outline di erent potential approaches. Implementing and evaluating those approaches is out of the scope of this work, and we plan to do so in future work.
In general, the a acker has to learn how the physical process reacts to changes in actuator states, and how the state of the physical process is transitioning over time. Such knowledge can be obtained through physical process estimations [22, 31] , manual data analysis, and machine learning approaches (e.g., similar to the ones employed for a ack detection for CPS [40] ). General learning of target CPS infrastructure has been discussed in [19] .
Based on a solid understanding of the process, the a acker needs to nd a sequence of actions that will lead to the goal state of the system, potentially while considering legitimate control reactions that are not under the in uence of the a acker. In addition, it is likely that the physical process simulation would be optimized to remain hidden from process observers for as long as possible, or reaches its goal as soon as possible (related tradeo s are discussed in [54] ). Commonly, such control strategies require continuous tracking of the process physical evolutions using state estimation techniques such as Kalman lters and Luenberger observers.
CPSBot: Stealthiness
ere are several ways to increase CPSBot stealthiness. We present a brief discussion about two strategies:
Stepping stones. We might want to introduce extra devices as intermediate proxies in the communication between the bots and the C&C [28] over the Internet.
ose extra nodes might introduce secure tunnels (e. g., use Tor [44] ). With this solution, we pay a penalty in terms of botnet latency and we should take into consideration if the tradeo is worth.
C&C Protocol. We understand that using a protocol for the C&C channel that is di erent from the target one might increase the possibility of detection. However, this is the case also when the C&C is using the same protocol as the target system [55] . Two solutions to mitigate this problem are encryption (e. g., TLS) and obfuscation (e. g., obfuscated data structures for MQTT messages).
RELATED WORK
We've seen novel designs of botnets from the cyber-security eld. For example, DNS botnet [4] , structured and unstructured peer-topeer botnets [42, 56] , server-less botnets [58] , botnet-as-a-service [11] , mobile botnets [34] , bitcoin-powered botnets [3] and botnets pivoting from social networks [13] . However, those designs are not addressing cyber-physical systems and OT networks.
ere are several interesting analysis of traditional IT botnets. In [51] , the authors managed to act as fake C&C servers and collected information about the Torpig botnet. In [2] , the authors presented a system able to capture and track more than 100 unique IRC-based botnets to measure the percentage of malicious tra c a ributed to those botnets on the Internet. In [35] , the authors proposed a botnet take-down analysis and recommendation system. However, none of those papers analyzes a cyber-physical botnet with suitable quantitative metrics such as latency and size of the C&C packets.
ere are recent academic works about cyber-physical a acks targeting several CPS devices. In particular, preferred targets are programmable logic controller (PLC). Authors discussed ransomware [20] , rmware modi cations [14] , rootkits [1] , physics-aware malware [21] , and stealthy Man-in-the-Middle [53] a acks. Recently, we have seen in the wild targeted a acks on Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) [25] . ose a acks target a single device and they are not performed using (cyber-physical) botnets.
We have seen also a empts to detect botnets for CPS. In particular, in [57] the authors are trying to detect P2P SCADA botnets by means of custom network monitoring. However, they assume to be a acked by a traditional P2P botnet.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we argue that adversarial control a acks on CPS requires a novel class of botnets that we de ne as cyber-physical.
ose botnets have di erent requirements from traditional IT botnets such as usage of adversarial control strategies, coordinated Table 2 : Evaluation of CPSBot attacks in a simulated environment and real testbed. T S , T C , T M are the SCADA, adversarial estimation and tra c manipulation periods. ∆ s is the average time di erence between the last valid RTU packet and the rst packet spoofed by a bot. ∆ r is the average time di erence between the last SCADA request and the rst valid spoofed bot response. µ d is the additional average delay introduced by the CPSBot measured from the SCADA server. n e is the number of Wireshark's expert info warnings and error messages. µ C PU and µ RAM are the approximate average CPU and RAM load on each bot. n B is the number of controlled substations. Our optimized CPSBot implementation is able to attack the system with delay (µ d = 0) as measured at the SCADA server. interactions among the bots, and additional constraints from the target system. To address those challenges we presented CPSBot: a framework to build cyber-physical botnets. We leverage on a publishersubscriber paradigm for the C&C channel to coordinate our bots with minimal overhead. We de ne an orthogonal set of traits to customize our bots and C&Cs according to their role in the a ack and their hardware and so ware capabilities. For example, the bots might be specialized for packet manipulation while a C&C focuses on generating adversarial control decisions. CPSBot allows using di erent adversarial control strategies like machine learning classi cation, real-time simulation, and Kalman ltering estimation. Furthermore, we are able to adapt our botnets to di erent network architectures, protocols, and physical processes.
We showed the design of a centralized botnet to a ack a centrally controlled CPS and a decentralized botnet to a ack a CPS with distributed control. We implemented the former using MQTT for the C&C protocol and Modbus/TCP as the target network protocol. We evaluate our implementation by performing two coordinated cyber-physical a acks: distributed eavesdropping, and distributed impersonation. We evaluate our a acks with custom cyber-physical botnets metrics and we showed that our CPSBot introduces zero additional delay (µ d = 0) while the system is under a ack. As result, CPSBot is able to conduct a acks that cause minimal temporal changes to the tra c, which hide the manipulation from operational alarms that might be in place.
We expect those ndings on capabilities will raise awareness with stakeholders of threatened systems, and allow the defenders to design more suitable countermeasures. Potential countermeasures against our CPSBot would include close monitoring of physical process states with hardened sensors, general hardening of industrial devices against exploitation, and network segmentation and monitoring.
